Claire Katz & Lara Trout, Emmanuel Levinas. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers ; Thomas Bedorf, Andreas Cremonini, Verfehlte Begegnung. Levinas und Sartre als philosophische Zeitgenossen ; Samuel Moyn, Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics ; Pascal Delhom & Alfred Hirsch, Im Angesicht der Anderen. Levinas’ Philosophie des Politischen ; Sharon Todd, Learning from the other: Levinas, psychoanalysis and ethical possibilities in education ; Michel Henry, Le bonheur de Spinoza, suivi de: Etude sur le (...) spinozisme de Michel Henry, par Jean-Michel Longneaux ; Jean-François Lavigne, Husserl et la naissance de la phénoménologie. Des Recherches logiques aux Ideen: la genèse de l’idéalisme transcendantal phénoménologique ; Denis Seron, Objet et signification ; Dan Zahavi, Sara Heinämaa and Hans Ruin, Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation. Phenomenology in The Nordic Countries ; Dimitri Ginev, Entre anthropologie et herméneutique ; Magdalena Mărculescu-Cojocea, Critica metafizicii la Kant şi Heidegger. Problema subiectivităţii: raţiunea între autonomie şi deconstrucţie. (shrink)

Der Schutz vor Gewalt und Verletzungen ist ohne Zweifel eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben jeder Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik. Denn kein Frieden kann von Dauer sein, in dem ein solcher Schutz nicht gewährleistet wird und in dem sich Menschen vor anderen Menschen fürchten müssen. Dies gilt umso mehr für eine Auffassung des gerechten Friedens, die nicht nur vor Gewalt, sondern auch vor Not zu schützen beansprucht. Wie allerdings dieser Schutz gewährt wird, hängt weitgehend von der Auffassung von Sicherheit ab, die ihn realisieren (...) soll. (shrink)

There was no dialogue between Simone Weil and Emmanuel Levinas. In many regards, however, their philosophies have much in common. Both defend a conception of human rights as rights of others and as an obligation for the self. Both understand this obligation as an obligation of attention and action for others, based on their needs and their vulnerability. Both find the source of this obligation in the transcendence of the other, and both connect it with a radical passivity of the (...) self, who is subjected to this obligation in spite of itself. At the same time, this proximity between the two philosophers entails and reveals profound differences between them, partially due to the difference between Weil’s metaphysics of light and Levinas’s metaphysics of language. These differences concern the status of subjectivity and of its duty toward the other, as well as the idea of an acceptation of sufferance, especially of the sufferance of others. (shrink)

There are three possible ways of access to phenomena of suffered violence: the first is the experience of those who have suffered violence themselves; the second is the experience of eyewitnesses; the third, which is the most frequent one, is an indirect access through the testimony of people belonging to the first two categories. Each way of access has advantages but also serious difficulties, both in terms of the objectivity of the experience and of the possibility to express it in (...) language. No one is free from an affective and a normative dimension; this implies that there is a certain tension with regard to the phenomenological reduction. The paper offers an analysis of these ways of access. (shrink)

In ihrem 2013 erschienenen Buch „Vertrauensfragen. Eine Obsession der Moderne“ beschreibt die Historikerin Ute Frevert, wie verbreitet das Thema des Vertrauens besonders seit dem 18. Jahrhundert gewesen ist. Vertrauen wird in vielen Bereichen des privaten und des öffentlichen Lebens thematisiert, versprochen und geschenkt, gefordert und beschworen und nicht selten enttäuscht und verloren. Ökonomische, soziale und politische Krisen, aber auch Beziehungskrisen werden dann vermehrt als Krisen des Vertrauens verstanden und dargestellt. Hierbei verweist Frevert auf die Ambivalenz des Begriffs, der als Gefühl (...) oder Kalkül, als asymmetrische Treue einem Elternteil oder einem charismatischen Führer gegenüber, als gegenseitige Erwartungshaltung im sozialen Feld oder sogar als Werbemittel in deregulierten Märkten verstanden werden kann, der aber auch die Grundlage von Missbrauch in manchen pädagogischen Beziehungen bildet. (shrink)

Frieden ist kein Zustand, der einfach besteht oder der angestrebt und – wenn auch in „einer ins Unendliche fortschreitenden Annäherung“, wie es bei Immanuel Kant heißt – erreicht werden kann. Er ist eine Aufgabe jedes Augenblicks in einer sich ständig verändernden Welt. In Zeiten des Krieges ist er eine Aufgabe des Friedensschlusses, in Friedenszeiten eine Aufgabe des Aufbaus und der Bewahrung einer Friedensordnung, in der Konflikte ohne Gewalt gelöst werden können.

Levinas’s conception of justice in Totality and Infinity is very different from the one developed in Otherwise than Being. Both are bound to the presence of the third party next to my neighbor. But whereas in the later work this presence leads to transform the responsibility of the I for the Other, to compare the neighbor and the third party for the sake of justice, hence to enter the sphere of visibility in which retributive justice is possible, it opens in (...) the early work to a fraternity of all humans, understood as a community of language, of expression, teaching, and commandment. Here, justice is a right to speak. I argue that these conceptions of justice are not only different. The early one can also be seen as the condition of the later one. And Levinas refers explicitly to it in Otherwise than Being as a justice that passes by justice. (shrink)

For a phenomenologist, the question that has to be asked about peace is not primarily whether it can be defined as the tranquillity of order, a law of nature or an infinite task, as it were according to Augustine, Hobbes and Kant. It is rather a question of its phenomenality : how does peace appear to us, how does it get visible? In his attempt to answer this question, Waldenfels privileges the event of a peace agreement and proposes a reconstruction (...) of its genealogy. (shrink)

Levinas' erstes Hauptwerk, Totalitat und Unendlichkeit, markiert den tiefsten Einschnitt in die Geschichte der Philosophie, der nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs zu verzeichnen war. Wie kein anderes steht es ganz unter dem Eindruck radikalster Gewalt, die den europaischen Kontinent verwustet hat. Dieser Gewalt setzt Levinas die unaufhebbare Alteritat des Anderen entgegen, mit der er einen unverfugbaren, zur Verantwortung fur den Anderen bestimmenden ethischen Anspruch verbindet. So entfaltet Levinas die Grundfrage aller Sozialphilosophie, die Frage nach dem Anderen, so, dass das (...) Ausgeliefertsein an eine eminent gewaltsame Geschichte nicht "das letzte Wort" hat. Dafur hat ethisches Denken einzustehen, das Levinas als sozialphilosophisches zur vorrangigen Aufgabe einer Ersten Philosophie erklart. In einem kooperativen Kommentar wird in die grundlegende Bedeutung dieses Ansatzes auf dem aktuellen internationalen Diskussionsstand eingefuhrt. Mit Beitragen von Hans-Christoph Askani, Gabriella Baptist, Alain David, Pascal Delhom, Matthias Flatscher, Alfred Hirsch, Antje Kapust, Alwin Letzkus, Burkhard Liebsch, Sophie Loidolt, Dieter Mersch, Christian Rossner, Hans-Martin Schonherr-Mann, Christina Schues, Sergej Seitz, Werner Stegmaier und Bernhard Taureck. (shrink)

When faced with uncertainty, consequentialists often advocate choosing the option with the largest expected utility, as calculated using the arithmetic average. I provide some arguments to suggest that instead, one should consider choosing the option with the largest geometric average of utility. I explore the difference between these two approaches in a variety of ethical dilemmas and argue that geometric averaging has some appealing properties as a normative decision-making tool.

The student of Max Scheler's work encounters several difficulties. First, the range of his preoccupation is unique in our time. During his most creative years, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of religion, and the phenomenology of emotional life were at the center of his interest. Later he became more and more involved in the ontological problems of society and reality and laid the foundation of a new sociology of knowledge. Second, Scheler's thought evolved in the course of his short life--he died in (...) 1928, barely fifty-four--through various phases which were hardly compatible with one another. He started as a student of Rudolph Eucken, the philosopher of life, who imbued his disciple with an admiration for St. Augustine and Pascal; he became deeply influenced by Nietzsche, Dilthey, Bergson, and above all, Husserl. Converted to Catholicism, Scheler became a convinced Christian--both a personalist and a theist. But very soon his attitude toward religion underwent a complete change; in a last pantheistic phase, he dedicated himself to the philosophical and sociological exploration of the human condition. He then conceived the development of world history as a progression from illogical and blind vital urges to the fulfillment of the destiny of humanity in the realms of values and spiritual existence, and interpreted the whole process as the manifestation of divine force, the becoming of God in the world. A third difficulty for the student of Scheler's thought is the lack of organization of his books, originating in his disdain of any attempt to visualize life in an artificially unified perspective of the kind which the construction of a philosophic system might offer. He was, as Ortega y Gasset said, in the true sense of Plato an "enthusiastic" philosopher. Overwhelmed by the wealth of his discoveries, he lived in a continuous haste of mind. He had to proclaim so many lucid insights that he staggered, bewildered by cognition and inebriated by truth. This explains the frequent inconsistencies of his thought and the lack of structure of his writings. (shrink)

Dans un roman d’anticipation qu’il situe en 19201, Alfred Jarry invente le personnage d’André Marcueuil, capable d’aller « au-delà des forces humaines », tant sexuelles que cyclistes. Durant la futuriste « course des dix mille milles »2, une quintuplette, sur laquelle pédalent cinq champions cyclistes, distance, grâce à un développement de « cinquante-sept mètres trente-quatre »,..

Alfred Stein, em memória de quem esse artigo é dedicado, mantinha, enquanto filósofo da história, a crença em valores absolutos como obsoletos bem como, enquanto filósofo da ética, o convencimento sobre a aleatoriedade relativista-cultural na valoração moral da ação humana. De uma tal valoração aparece indicado reconstruir a ação adequadamente, ou seja, compreendê-la intencionalmente e explicá-la por meio da causalidade. No decorrer desse compreender e desse explicar, se deve fazer uma referência a isso que Stern com, entre outros, Blaise (...) Pascal, chama de “a condição humana” (la condition humaine): o fato de que o humano é um ser consciente de si mesmo, de que ele é determinado por uma vontade de autopreservação, de que ele ama e odeia, de que ele sofre, busca escapar do sofrimento, de que ele sabe de sua mortalidade e, por fim, morre. De maneira semelhante à anthropéia physis de Thukydides, essas condições variantes resultam decorrer de ação bem diferentes e padrões de comportamento, de acordo com as especificidades da situação histórica – parecido com como um balão sobe, sob o efeito da mesma lei da gravidade, uma pedra, entretanto, cai ao chão. Seguindo essa construção compreensivo-explicativa da ação, vêm a sua valoração moral. Esta é, com Stein, guiada pelo princípio da liberdade como de um ser-livre de pressão e pelo princípio da maior minimização possível do sofrimento humano. (shrink)

Self-deception raises complex questions about the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. In this book, Alfred Mele addresses four of the most critical of these questions: What is it to deceive oneself? How do we deceive ourselves? Why do we deceive ourselves? Is self-deception really possible? -/- Drawing on cutting-edge empirical research on everyday reasoning and biases, Mele takes issue with commonplace attempts to equate the processes of self-deception with those of stereotypical interpersonal deception. Such (...) attempts, he demonstrates, are fundamentally misguided, particularly in the assumption that self-deception is intentional. In their place, Mele proposes a compelling, empirically informed account of the motivational causes of biased beliefs. At the heart of this theory is an appreciation of how emotion and motivation may, without our knowing it, bias our assessment of evidence for beliefs. Highlighting motivation and emotion, Mele develops a pair of approaches for explaining the two forms of self-deception: the "straight" form, in which we believe what we want to be true, and the "twisted" form, in which we believe what we wish to be false. -/- Underlying Mele's work is an abiding interest in understanding and explaining the behavior of real human beings. The result is a comprehensive, elegant, empirically grounded theory of everyday self-deception that should engage philosophers and social scientists alike. (shrink)

Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that the evidence (...) offered to support these claims is sorely deficient. He also shows that there is strong empirical support for the thesis that some conscious decisions and intentions have a genuine place in causal explanations of corresponding actions. In short, there is weighty evidence of the existence of effective conscious intentions or the power of conscious will. Mele examines the accuracy of subjects' reports about when they first became aware of decisions or intentions in laboratory settings and develops some implications of warranted skepticism about the accuracy of these reports. In addition, he explores such questions as whether we must be conscious of all of our intentions and why scientists disagree about this. Mele's final chapter closes with a discussion of imaginary scientific findings that would warrant bold claims about free will and consciousness of the sort he examines in this book. (shrink)

Since its origin, bioethics has attracted the collaboration of few social scientists, and social scientific methods of gathering empirical data have remained unfamiliar to ethicists. Recently, however, the clouded relations between the empirical and normative perspectives on bioethics appear to be changing. Three reasons explain why there was no easy and consistent input of empirical evidence into bioethics. Firstly, interdisciplinary dialogue runs the risk of communication problems and divergent objectives. Secondly, the social sciences were absent partners since the beginning of (...) bioethics. Thirdly, the meta‐ethical distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ created a ‘natural’ border between the disciplines. Now, bioethics tends to accommodate more empirical research. Three hypotheses explain this emergence. Firstly, dissatisfaction with a foundationalist interpretation of applied ethics created a stimulus to incorporate empirical research in bioethics. Secondly, clinical ethicists became engaged in empirical research due to their strong integration in the medical setting. Thirdly, the rise of the evidence‐based paradigm had an influence on the practice of bioethics. However, a problematic relationship cannot simply and easily evolve into a perfect interaction. A new and positive climate for empirical approaches has arisen, but the original difficulties have not disappeared. (shrink)

Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-like states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing (...) to defend aesthetic non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstong have argued that Internalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements by raising objections against aesthetic internalism. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections can be raised against internalism about moral judgements as well. As a result, internalism is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of internalism about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections. (shrink)

Importance.--Expression.--Understanding.--Perspective.--Forms of process.--Civilized universe.--Nature lifeless.--Nature alive.--The aim of philosophy.

The fundamental, irreplaceable exposition of general semantics. In this work Korzybski developed important lines of formulating neglected by subsequent authors. A must-have for the student of general semantics interested in the original formulations of Alfred Korzybski. The sixth edition of Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics includes a new preface by Lance Strate, President of the Institute of General Semantics.

Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.

Recent work in biology, cognitive psychology, and archaeology has renewed evolutionary perspectives on the role of natural selection in the emergence and recurrent forms of religious thought and behavior, i.e., mental representations of supernatural agents, as well as artifacts, ritual practices, moral systems, ethnic markers, and specific experiences associated with these representations. One perspective, inspired from behavioral ecology, attempts to measure the fitness effects of religious practices. Another set of models, representative of evolutionary psychology, explain religious thought and behavior as (...) the output of cognitive systems (e.g., animacy detection, social cognition, precautionary reasoning) that are not exclusive to the religious domain. In both perpectives, the question remains open, whether religious thought and behavior constitute an adaptation or a by-product of adaptive cognitive function. (shrink)

The first three chapters are personal history, highly picturesque and amusing, illumined by flashes of his lively humor....From here the chapters go on into Philosophy, Education, and Science. covering a span of thrity years though these writings do, they are surprizingly unified. Atlantic.

Influential classical and recent approaches to explicate confirmation, explanation, or explanatory power define these relations or degrees between hypotheses and evidence. This holds for both deductive and Bayesian approaches. However, this neglects the role of data, which for many everyday and scientific examples cannot simply be classified as evidence. I present arguments to sharply distinguish data from evidence in Bayesian approaches. Taking into account this distinction, we can rewrite Schupbach and Sprenger’s measure of explanatory power and show the strengths of (...) this adaptation by applying it to the example of the detection of gravitational waves in physics. (shrink)

I - Individuals 1 2 - The Identity of Indiscernibles 26 3 - Negation 36 4 - The Terminology of Sense-Data 66 5 - Basic Propositions 105 6 - Phenomenalism 125 7 - Statements About the Past 167 8 - One’s Knowledge of Other Minds 191 9 - On What There Is 215 10 - On the Analysis of Moral Judgements 231 11 - The Principle of Utility 250 12 - Freedom and Necessity 271 Index 285.